A one-way permutation (OWP) is one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives, and can be used as a building block for most of basic symmetric-key cryptographic primitives. However, despite its importance and usefulness, previous black-box separation results have shown that constructing a OWP from another primitive seems hopeless, unless building blocks already achieve "one-way" property and "permutation" property simultaneously. In this paper, in order to clarify more about the constructions of a OWP from other primitives, we study the construction of a OWP from primitives that are very close to a OWP. Concretely, as a negative result, we show that there is no fully black-box construction of a OWP from a length-increasing injective one-way function (OWF), even if the latter is just 1-bit-increasing and achieves strong form of one-wayness which we call adaptive one-wayness. As a corollary, we show that there is no fully black-box construction of a OWP from a regular OWF with regularity greater than 1. Since a permutation is length-preserving and injective, and is a regular OWF with regularity 1, our negative result indicates that to construct a OWP from another primitive is quite difficult, even if we use very close primitives to a OWP as building blocks. Moreover, we extend our separation result of a OWP from a length-increasing injective OWF, and show a certain restrictive form of black-box separations among injective OWFs in terms of how much a function stretches its input. This result shows a hierarchy among injective OWFs (including a OWP).
Introduction
A one-way permutation (OWP) is one of the most fundamental cryptographic primitives 1 . It has been shown that OWPs are sufficient for constructing most of basic "symmetric-key" primitives, which include, e.g. pseudorandom generators [18, 2] , pseudorandom functions [4] , symmetric-key encryption schemes and message authentication codes. While most of primitives implied by a OWP are ⋆ Takahiro Matsuda is supported by JSPS Research Fellowships for Young Scientists. 1 Unless otherwise stated explicitly, whenever we say "OWP", we mean a single OWP, not a family of OWPs later shown to be implied by an ordinary one-way function (OWF) (e.g. a pseudorandom generator from any OWF [7] ), it is usual that a primitive built from a OWP is more efficient than the one built from a general OWF. Therefore, a OWP is still quite an important primitive, and constructions of a OWP from other (simpler) primitives (possibly efficiently) is worth studying. However, how to construct a OWP from other primitives has not been studied well, compared to constructions of other primitives that use a OWP as a building block. In this paper, we focus on constructions of OWPs. There are several negative results on this, in terms of black-box constructions 2 . The combination of the results by Rudich [14] and Kahn et al. [10] shows that there is no black-box construction of a OWP from a OWF. Chang et al. [3] later extend it and show that there is no black-box construction of a OWP from (a family of) trapdoor functions or private information retrieval protocols. These negative results indicate that it is quite difficult to construct a OWP from other primitives. There are also some positive results. However, to the best of our knowledge, the only positive results about the construction of a OWP are the constructions from primitives which already have "one-way" property and "permutation" property simultaneously: Yao [18] shows that the existence of a permutation which is weakly one-way implies that of a (normal) OWP. Goldreich et al. [5] show that if a family of OWPs satisfies some special properties, it can be used to construct a single OWP.
Taking into account these negative and positive results on the constructions of OWPs, a natural question that arises here is: Which properties of a OWP make it hard to construct a OWP from other primitives? To clarify this, in this paper, we focus on a special type of OWFs, a length-increasing injective OWF, and tackle the problem of whether we can construct a OWP from it. Recall that a permutation is a function which is both length-preserving and injective. Therefore, a length-increasing injective OWF is one of the primitives that is extremely close to a OWP. Regarding this problem, our answer is negative.
The problem on a OWP versus a length-increasing injective OWF can be generalized into the following form: Let m, ℓ be integers with m > ℓ ≥ 0. Can we construct an ℓ-bit-increasing injective OWF from an m-bit-increasing injective OWF? (Note that if m ≤ ℓ, then the answer to the question is trivially yes.) We also tackle this problem and show a partial negative answer.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we show that even if we use a very close primitive to a OWP, it is impossible to construct a OWP in a black-box manner. More concretely, we show in Section 3 that there is no fully black-box construction 3 of a OWP from a length-increasing injective OWF, even if the latter is just 1-bit-increasing and achieves stronger type of one-wayness which we call adaptive one-wayness (see below). We note that this separation result is not implied by the previous results [14, 10, 3] on a black-box separation of a OWP from other primitives. Actually, one of the results in [3] implies the separation of a OWP from an injective OWF whose range is sparse (e.g. length-tripling functions). However, our impossibility holds as long as the building block injective OWF is lengthincreasing, regardless of the sparseness of the range. An immediate corollary of the separation result is the non-existence of a fully black-box construction of a OWP from a regular OWF 4 for any regularity greater than 1. Note that a OWP is also a regular OWF with regularity 1. Therefore, our negative results suggest that constructing a OWP is quite difficult (or maybe impossible) unless a building block primitive already achieves both "one-way" property and "permutation" property simultaneously.
Moreover, we extend our above result to show some restricted type of blackbox separations among injective OWFs. More precisely, we show in Section 4 that for any integer pair (ℓ, m) satisfying m > ℓ ≥ 0, there is no range-invariant fully black-box construction of an ℓ-bit-increasing injective OWF from an m-bitincreasing injective OWF, where a construction of an injective OWF from other primitives is said to be range-invariant if the range of the constructed injective OWF depends only on the construction and is independent of the building block primitives. Note that a OWP is a 0-bit-increasing injective OWF, and any construction of a OWP from other primitives is inherently range-invariant, and thus our first separation result is the special case of the latter one in which ℓ = 0. Although this range-invariance condition seems a bit heavy when ℓ > 0, this result shows a hierarchy among injective OWFs (including a OWP), and we think this result is interesting. So far, we are not sure whether we can remove the range-invariance condition from this separation result, and thus we would like to leave it as an open problem.
In order to make our black-box separation results stronger, for both of our separation results, we consider a stronger type of one-wayness, adaptive onewayness, for building block OWFs. Roughly, an injective function is adaptively one-way if it is one-way against adversaries that have access to a "magical" inversion oracle which takes a string (other than a challenge instance that the adversary has to invert) as input and returns the inverse of the value. Our definition of adaptive one-wayness is different from the one introduced by Pandey et al. [11] who considered it in a "tag-based" setting while ours does not consider it. See Section 2 for a formal definition.
Technical Overview of Our Separation Results
The combination the results by Rudich [14] and Kahn et al. [10] shows that there is no (so-called ∀∃ semi-)black-box construction of a OWP from a OWF. However, it is known that if we only need to exclude a more restrictive form of black-box constructions, fully black-box constructions, of a OWP from a OWF, proving the following statement is sufficient (see also [12] 6 Let us call this statement "(A)". Since we will use the basic proof strategy for the statement (A) in our blackbox separation results, we briefly outline the proof, and then explain the problems that arise when proving our results.
Basic Proof Strategy for Separation of OWP and (Ordinary) OWF. To prove the statement (A), we construct a computationally unbounded adversary A that makes only polynomially many queries to its given random oracle O and successfully inverts P O : Given a string y * ∈ {0, 1} k which A has to find the preimege under P O , A first generates an empty list L that will be used to maintain the "known" query/answer pair of O, and then repeats the following steps 1 to 3 for polynomially many times:
Step 1: find a string x ′ and an oracle O under the condition: 
for all α ∈ L and (ii) for all other inputs from {0, 1}
* \L, the range of O and that of O are disjoint. It will be shown later that picking such O is always possible as long as O is length-increasing.
Another problem that arises here is that it might not be possible to execute Step 1 modified as above by only using a PSPACE-complete oracle and making only polynomially many queries to O, because it seems that we need the entire knowledge about the range of O in order to pick such O. However, since O is a random m-bit-increasing injective oracle, it seems hard to know the range of O entirely by making only polynomially many queries to O. To solve it, we adopt the so-called "two oracle" separation paradigm introduced by Hsiao and Reyzin [8] , which is sufficient for showing the non-existence of fully black-box constructions. More concretely, we introduce another oracle B (which we call "breaking oracle") that helps A to do the above procedure of picking
where O is chosen as above. To make Step 3 possible, the oracle B also outputs a query set that is made by
Now, since we have introduced a new oracle B, we also have to show that an m-bit-increasing injective oracle O is one-way in the presence of B. We will show that (adaptive) one-wayness of O in the presence of B can be reduced to (adaptive) one-wayness of a random permutation oracle π against computationally unbounded adversary S that makes only polynomially many queries.
Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some basic definitions and facts used for describing our results. In Section 3, we show our main result on a black-box separation of a OWP from a length-increasing injective OWF, and we extend the result for a restricted type of black-box separations among injective OWFs in Section 4.
Preliminaries
In this section, we review basic definitions and some fact necessary used for describing our results.
Basic Notations. Throughout this paper, we use the following notations: "N" denotes the set of natural numbers. "x||y" denotes a concatenation of x and y. If x is a string, then "|x|" denotes the bit length of x. "x ← y" denotes an assignment of y to x. If S is a set, then "|S|" denotes its size, and "x ← R S" denotes that x is chosen uniformly at random from S. If Ψ is a probability distribution, then "x ← R Ψ " denotes that x is chosen according to Ψ , and
denotes that A takes x, y, . . . as input and outputs z, and "A O " denotes that A has oracle access to an oracle O. If f is a function/algorithm/oracle and S is a (sub)domain of f , then we define f (S) = {f (x)|x ∈ S}. We say that an oracle algorithm has query complexity q if the algorithm makes at mostueries to its given oracle. "Perm n " denotes the set of all permutations over {0,
for any positive polynomial p(k) and all sufficiently large k ∈ N.
One-Way Functions
We say that a function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * is a one-way function (OWF) if there exists a PPTA that for any x computes f (x), and for any PPTA A, the following advantage function Adv
If the function f is injective, then we call it an injective OWF. If f is injective and length-preserving (i.e. permutation), we call it a one-way permutation (OWP).
If |f −1 (f (x))| = |f −1 (f (y))| for any x, y ∈ {0, 1} n and any n ∈ N, we call it a regular OWF, and in particular, if α(n) = |f −1 (f (x))|, then we call it an α-regular OWF.
Adaptive One-wayness for Injective Functions. In this paper, we will use a stronger type of one-wayness for strengthening our black-box separation results.
We say that an injective function f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * is adaptive one-way, if there exists a PPTA that for any x computes f (x), and for any PPTA A, the following advantage function Adv
where f −1 ̸ =y * (·) is the inversion oracle which takes a string y as input and outputs x such that f (x) = y if such x exists and y ̸ = y * , or outputs ⊥ otherwise. We also say that f is an adaptive one-way function (AOWF). (Whenever we say f is an AOWF, we always mean that f is injective.)
Basic Fact about Random Permutations
In this paper, we will use a simple fact that a random permutation is adaptively one-way even against a computationally unbounded adversary who is given oracle access to the permutation and its inversion only polynomially many times.
Let A be an oracle adversary. Consider the following experiment Expt
(Here, "RP" stands for "random permutation", and note that the experiment includes the choice of the permutation π.) We define the advantage function of an oracle adversary A by Adv
Regarding the above experiment, the following is easy to prove (the proof is omitted due to lack of space).
Lemma 1. For any (even computationally unbounded) adversary A with polynomial query complexity, Adv
AOW RP,A (k) is negligible in k. Specifically, if A has query complexity q, then Adv AOW RP,A (k) ≤ (q+1) 2 k −q .
Black-box Separation of OWP from Length-Increasing
Injective AOWF
In this section, we show that there is no fully black-box construction of a OWP from a length-increasing injective OWF, even if the latter is just 1-bit-increasing and achieves adaptive one-wayness.
We first recall the formal definition of a fully black-box construction [13] of a OWP from an m-bit-increasing injective AOWF. 
Then, there is no fully black-box construction of a OWP from an m-bit-increasing injective AOWF.
In order to use Lemma 2, we define the distribution Ψ of an oracle pair (O, B) in Section 3.1. Then we show that Ψ satisfies the conditions (1) and (2) in Section 3.2, and Ψ satisfies the condition (3) in Section 3.3. Finally in Section 3.4 we show the formal proof of Theorem 1. 
Definitions of Oracles and Their Distribution
By definition, if the running time of P is bounded by τ P , then
Now, we describe the definition of the breaking oracle B formally. Our breaking oracle B is associated with an m-bit-increasing injective oracle O ∈ O m . Since B generates a slightly different m-bit-increasing injective oracle O based on O during its procedure, in order not to mix up them we refer to the oracle O with which B is associated as the "original oracle", and the oracle O that is generated in the procedure of B as a "modified oracle".
B takes the following three objects as input:
1. a description of an oracle algorithm P that is a candidate of a OWP.
2. a set of strings L ⊆ {0, 1} * 3. a string y B then does the following:
Step 
Step 3 (Finding a preimage and a query set wrt. O): Find x such that P O (x) = y. (Note that x ∈ {0, 1} |y| is unique since it is guaranteed by Correctness check that P O implements a permutation over {0, 1} |y| .) Output x and the corresponding query set QS P O (x) .
The above completes the description of B. Although B is probabilistic (see Step 2) , in order to make B behave as a deterministic function, we assume that the randomness B uses to pick functions {g ′ n (·)} n∈N is fixed for each input to B, and make B choose the same functions {g ′ n (·)} n∈N for the same input (P, L, y).) Let τ P be the maximum running time of P, where the maximum is over all oracles O ∈ O m and all inputs of length |y|. Similarly to [15] and [17] , we count each B-query as |L|+τ P queries, rather than naively counting it as a single query, and make B output the response after these steps have passed from the point B receives the input. This is to prevent an adversary from making a very "large" B-query that may give too much information about O to the adversary. 
We call a B-query valid if the correctness check passes, and invalid otherwise. What should be noticed about the modified m-bit-increasing injective oracle
. By the given condition, P will pass the correctness check. Let O be the modified m-bit-increasing injective oracle generated in the step 2 of B. By the definition of B and the given condition
. This means that P O (x) = P O (x) = y and
is a permutation, the preimage of y under P O (·) is unique and must be x, which is found and output in Step 3 of B together with the query set QS P O (x) = QS P O (x) . This completes the proof of Lemma 3.
⊓ ⊔
Distribution Ψ of Oracles (O, B). We define "how to pick oracles (O, B) according to the distribution Ψ " as follows: Pick an m-bit-increasing injective oracle
O ∈ O m uniformly at random, and then pick the breaking oracle B associated with O (B's internal randomness is fixed in this step). of (O, B) ) of the advantage of the adversary A attacking adaptive one-wayness of O can be written as:
Adaptive
For notational convenience, we denote by Expt
and we write Adv
Assume towards a contradiction that Adv AOW Om,A (k) is not negligible. Then, we show that we can construct another computationally unbounded adversary S that has query complexity at most τ A (and thus has polynomial query complexity) and has non-negligible advantage in the experiment Expt AOW RP,S (k), which will contradict Lemma 1. S is given 1 k and an image β * = π(α * ) for randomly chosen α * ∈ {0, 1} k and π ∈ Perm k , is given oracle access to π and π −1 ̸ =β * , and has to find α * . The description of S
(Below, recall that S is computationally unbounded and thus can do very powerful things such as picking an injective function uniformly, etc.) Firstly, S picks its own m-bit-increasing injective oracle O ∈ O m uniformly at random 8 . Next, S defines a slightly modified m-bitincreasing injective oracle O π into which S's oracle π is "embedded" as follows:
Note that this modification does not change the range of the m-bit-increasing injective oracle, i.e. O π ({0, 1} 9 . If the check fails, S returns ⊥ to A after |L| + τ P steps from the point A made the B-query, where τ P is the maximum running time of P. Next, for each α ∈ L ∩ {0, 1} k , S issues α to π and obtains the corresponding
Step 2 of B 10 . As mentioned earlier, S does not have all the knowledge about the m-bit-increasing injective oracle O π that S is using for simulating Expt AOW Om,A for A, because π is not entirely known to S. However, for the strings α ∈ L ∩ {0, 1} k , the corresponding evaluations O(π(α) ) are already calculated in the above step, and to generate O π , no further knowledge about π(·) is needed. Note also that O itself was generated by S, and the range of O π is identical to that of O (i.e. O π ({0, 1} * ) = O({0, 1} * )), which means that S can appropriately pick an injective function g
n+m \O π ({0, 1} n )) for each input length n ∈ N. 3. S finds x such that P Oπ (x) = y and the corresponding query set QS P Oπ (x) by using S's computationally unbounded power and the entire knowledge about O π . Finally, S returns x and QS P O (x) to A after |L| + τ P steps from the point A made this B-query.
When A terminates with an output, S outputs what A outputs as a candidate of the preimage of β * under π and terminates.
The above completes the description of S. Let us confirm the query complexity of S. S issues at most one query to π (resp. π ̸ =y * -query), and at most |L| queries to π for simulating a response to a B-query. Recall that in the original experiment Expt AOW Om,A , each B-query (P, L, y) is responded after |L| + τ P steps from the point B is invoked, where τ P is the maximum running time of P (for |y|-bit input). These imply that the number of S's queries never exceeds A's running time. Since the running time of A is at most τ A , S's query complexity is at most τ A .
Moreover, as we have explained in the description of S, S perfectly simulates the experiment Expt 
, S also succeeds in outputting the preimage
is non-negligible, so is Adv AOW RP,S (k). Since S has only polynomial query complexity (at most polynomial τ A ), this contradicts Lemma 1, and thus
] must be negligible. This completes the proof of Lemma 4. ⊓ ⊔
Breaking Any Candidate of One-Way Permutation with B
In this subsection, we show that for any candidate of a OWP that is constructed using an m-bit-increasing injective oracle O ∈ O m , there is a perfect inverter that has access to O and B, where (O, B) are chosen according to Ψ defined in Section 3.1.
Lemma 5. For any oracle PPTA
Proof. Fix an oracle PPTA P such that P O ′ implements a permutation for all O ′ ∈ O m . Let τ P = τ P (k) be the maximum running time of P on input k-bit strings. Since P is a PPTA, τ P is a polynomial.
The expectation (over the choice of (O, B) ) of the advantage of an oracle PPTA adversary A attacking the one-wayness of P O can be written as:
For notational convenience, we denote by Expt OW P,A (k) the experiment
( Expt OW P,A (k) includes the sampling of oracles (O, B) according to Ψ ), and we write Adv
] .
We show that there is an oracle PPTA adversary A such that Adv 
, and goes to the next iteration.
If A does not terminate after τ P + 1 iterations, A simply gives up and aborts.
The above completes the description of A. We first confirm the query complexity of A. Clearly, the query complexity becomes maximum if A performs all τ P + 1 iterations without discovering the preimage. Thus we consider this case. In the i-th iteration, A makes one B-query (P, L i , y * ) which is counted as |L i | + τ P queries, and executes P O once during which at most τ P queries are made to O. Therefore, in the i-th iteration, the query complexity can increase by at most
Since |L 1 | = 0 and it is always the case that
. This implies that in the i-th iteration, the query complexity can increase by at most P + 2τ P = τ P (τ P + 2). Thus, after τ P + 1 iterations, A's total query complexity is at most τ P (τ P + 1)(τ P + 2), which is polynomial in k. Therefore, the number of steps incurred by the use of oracles (O, B) is at most polynomial, which means A works in polynomial time.
Next, we show that A can always find the preimage x * of y * under P O . We show the following key claim, which states that in each iteration A either finds the preimage x * or finds at least one "undiscovered" O-query α ∈ QS P O (x * ) \L i , i.e. a query to O that is made by P during a computation of For every i ∈ {1 , . . . , τ P }, at least one of the following two is true:
Proof of Claim 1. Assume towards a contradiction that we have both (a)
latter means that the set QS P O (x * ) \L i and the set QS
Consider the following "hybrid" oracle O defined by: 
Therefore, P O also implements a permutation. Next, we confirm the property of this hybrid oracle O. The condition (b) and the definitions of O, O i , and O imply the following relations among these oracles:
where (2) is due to the condition (b), i.e. the set QS P O (x * ) \L i and the set QS P O i (xi) \L i are disjoint. On the one hand, (1) and (2) 
In summary, we have P O (x * ) = P O (x i ) = y * , while we also have x * ̸ = x i by the condition (a). This is a contradiction because P O is a permutation, which cannot have a collision. Therefore, our hypothesis must be false, and (a) or (b) must be true. This completes the proof of Claim 1.
⊓ ⊔ Due to Claim 1, in the i-th iteration (for 1 ≤ i ≤ τ P ) A finds the preimage x * and stops, or the set QS P O i (xi) \L i contains at least one α which is contained
, the size of the set of "undiscovered queries" QS P O (x * ) \L i decreases at least by one in each iteration. Recall that |QS P O (x * ) | ≤ τ P . Therefore, when A is executed, A finds the preimage x * and stops within τ P iterations, or after τ P iterations we have
In the latter case, by Lemma 3, the (τ P + 1)-th B-query (P, L τ P +1 , y * ) results in x * (and QS P O (x * ) ). These imply that A always outputs x * within τ P + 1 iterations, which means that we have Adv 
Putting Everything Together
Here, we show the formal proof of Theorem 1. 
Then, there is no range-invariant fully black-box construction of an ℓ-bit-increasing injective OWF from an m-bit-increasing injective AOWF.
We remark that the range-invariance condition in Theorem 2 is due to the additional condition on the range of G O in (3) in the above lemma. The reason why we need this additional condition on the range of G is to ensure that if a string y is in the range of 
where O is the modified oracle generated in the step 2 of B and x is a string found in the step 3 of B. (Without the checks, it is possible that such x does not exist, which we want to avoid.) The distribution Ψ is also naturally defined.
The statement corresponding to Lemma 4, which roughly states that a random m-bit-increasing injective function is adaptively one-way even against adversaries with access to B that is modified as above, can be similarly proved as Lemma 4. To show the statement corresponding to Lemma 5, which roughly states that no ℓ-bit-increasing injective function G O with the "range-invariance" can be one-way if B is available, we need to rely on the additional assumption on the range of G, especially when showing the statement analogous to Claim 1. Recall that in order to prove Claim 1 by contradiction we need a property that under several different oracles, namely the original oracle O, the modified oracle O i , and the "hybrid oracle" O, P always implements a permutation and causes a situation in which y * = P O (x * ) = P O (x i ) and x * ̸ = x i . In order for the same strategy to work, the challenge instance y * needs to belong to the range of the ℓ-bit-increasing injective functions G O , G Oi , and G O . Due to the assumption we have made, however, it is guaranteed that y * always belong to the range of these ℓ-bit-increasing injective functions, and we can cause a situation in which y * = G O (x * ) = G O (x i ) and x * ̸ = x i .
